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Perhaps the most distinguished spokesman for the 
proposition that state constitutions are separate sources of 
fundamental rights is Justice Brennan. He first drew attention 
to state constitutions in a speech delivered at the annual 
meeting of the New Jersey State Bar Association in 1976. His 
Harvard Law Review article in the following year has been 
regarded as the Magna Carta of state constitutional law. Just 
two weeks ago, at the dedication of our new courtroom in 
Trenton, he again referred to the fact that state constitutions 
may provide greater protection than the federal Constitution. 
He urged the audience to rejoice in the perception by state 
courts “that state constitutions, too, are a font of individual 
liberties, their protections often extending beyond those 
required by the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation 
of federal law . . . .” 
Stewart G. Pollock 
Associate Justice 
Supreme Court of New Jersey1 
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 1 Stewart G. Pollock, Address, State Constitutions as Separate Sources of 
Fundamental Rights, 35 RUTGERS L. REV. 707, 716 (1983) (alteration in original) (footnote 
omitted) (quoting William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of 
Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 491 (1977)); see also Judith S. Kaye, State 
Courts at the Dawn of a New Century: Common Law Courts Reading Statutes and 
Constitutions, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 11 (1995) (“No doubt in part attributable to his 
experience as a state court judge, nearly twenty years ago Justice Brennan issued his now 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The members of Ohio State Law Journal are to be commended for their 
recognition of Justice Brennan’s continuing influence on state constitutional 
law, together with their focus on the current state of the field. As noted above 
by former Justice Stewart Pollock of New Jersey, Justice Brennan’s famous 
Harvard Law Review article had its origins in a 1976 speech to the New Jersey 
State Bar Association.2 Over the years, however, Justice Brennan’s article and 
his dissenting opinions calling on state courts to evaluate constitutional issues 
on their own regardless of what the United States Supreme Court had held, 
drew not only accolades but also criticism. For example, Paul Bator 
complained: 
And I regard it as inappropriate for Supreme Court Justices themselves to 
campaign to enact into unreviewable state constitutional law dissenting views 
about federal constitutional law which have been duly rejected by the United 
States Supreme Court. [F]or an example of a not at all subtle invitation of this 
sort, [see] Michigan v. Mosley.3  
My colleague, Earl Maltz even referred to Justice Brennan as a “false 
prophet” of the benefits of federalism.4 Much of this criticism portrayed 
Justice Brennan as a “Johnny-come-lately” to the field of state constitutional 
law, “discovering” this alternative route to liberal results only after the change 
in personnel on the United States Supreme Court left him in the minority. In 
fact, however, that is quite an inaccurate picture: Justice Brennan was deeply 
involved with state constitutional law in New Jersey going all the way back to 
his important work on judicial reform during the 1947 New Jersey 
Constitutional Convention.5 
                                                                                                                     
 2 Pollock, supra note 1, at 716. See generally William J. Brennan, Jr., State 
Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977). 
 3 Paul M. Bator, The State Courts and Federal Constitutional Litigation, 22 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 605, 606 n.1 (1981) (emphasis added) (citing Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 
96, 120–21 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting)). 
 4 Earl M. Maltz, False Prophet—Justice Brennan and the Theory of State 
Constitutional Law, 15 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 429, 429 (1988); see also Earl M. Maltz, 
The Dark Side of State Court Activism, 63 TEX. L. REV. 995, 1007, 1018 (1985); Earl M. 
Maltz, The Political Dynamic of the “New Judicial Federalism,” 2 EMERGING ISSUES ST. 
CONST. L. 233, 233–35 (1989). 
 5 See Robert F. Williams, Justice Brennan, The New Jersey Supreme Court, and 
State Constitutions: The Evolution of a State Constitutional Consciousness, 29 RUTGERS 
L.J. 763, 772–73 (1998). 
2016] SYMPOSIUM FOREWORD 205 
Of course when Justice Brennan shined his influential spotlight on state 
constitutional law in 1977 he was not the first to point out the importance of 
state constitutions in the protection of individual rights. The recognition of this 
truism had been pointed out by less influential scholars much earlier.6 Still, as 
recognized by this Symposium, and the scholarly articles herein, Justice 
Brennan’s exhortation has been the most important stimulus for consideration 
of state constitutional rights provisions as possibly providing rights protection 
beyond the Federal Constitution’s national minimum standards, or, the “New 
Judicial Federalism.”7 For example, Professor Ann Lousin documented the 
early impact of Justice Brennan’s article thirty years ago,8 an analysis she has 
continued in these pages. Her article brings up to date the crucial areas of 
adequate and independent state law grounds, techniques of interpreting state 
constitutional rights provisions such as “lockstepping,” techniques of 
interpreting state constitutional provisions with no federal counterpart, and 
whether and when national uniformity is desirable in constitutional 
interpretation.9  
Professor Jim Gardner, in his usually slightly contrarian style, provides a 
detailed retrospective of the evolution of state constitutional rights protections 
under the influence of Justice Brennan’s article, followed by a clear-headed 
description of the remaining inadequacies in state constitutional rights 
adjudication.10 He then provides an important “alternative view” of the 
American state constitutions as constituting an integral component of a larger 
system of “dual agency” in the enforcement of constitutional guarantees.11 
II. AMENDING STATE CONSTITUTIONS 
One of the key distinctions between state constitutions and the Federal 
Constitution is the relative ease of amending state constitutions.12 Based on 
this relative availability of textual change in state constitutions, involving a 
vote of the people in forty-nine out of the fifty states, I have suggested that 
                                                                                                                     
 6 See, e.g., Robert Force, State “Bills of Rights”: A Case of Neglect and the Need for 
a Renaissance, 3 VAL. U. L. REV. 125, 126 (1969); Robert F. Williams, Foreword, Looking 
Back at the New Judicial Federalism’s First Generation, 30 VAL. U. L. REV. xiii, xiv–xvi 
(1996). 
 7 See Robert F. Williams, The New Judicial Federalism in Ohio: The First Decade, 
51 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 415, 416 (2004) (explaining that the New Judicial Federalism refers 
to the renewed interested in state constitutional rights, dating from the early 1970s). 
 8 See generally Ann Lousin, Justice Brennan: A Tribute to a Federal Judge Who 
Believes in State’s Rights, 20 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1, 1–2 (1986). 
 9 Ann M. Lousin, Justice Brennan’s Call to Arms—What Has Happened Since 
1977?, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. 387 (2016). 
 10 James A. Gardner, Justice Brennan and the Foundations of Human Rights 
Federalism, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. 355 (2016). 
 11 Id. at 374–84. 
 12 ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, THE LAW OF AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONS 28 (2009). 
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state constitutions are “more democratic” than the Federal Constitution.13 
Further, Dr. Alan Tarr and I have suggested a number of innovative 
approaches to state constitutional change, some of which have not been very 
widely utilized.14 In this Symposium Dr. Tarr provides a detailed analysis of 
the forms of “popular constitutionalism” in the states as compared to at the 
federal level.15 Professor Sanford Levinson, a relatively recent convert to the 
study of state constitutional law,16 and his coauthor Professor William Blake, 
have provided important new, empirical analysis of the details of the different 
processes of state constitutional change.17 This article adds greatly to our 
understanding of these different processes, and promises to stimulate further 
useful research. 
The state of Ohio is currently engaged in a multiyear review of its state 
constitution by the Ohio State Constitutional Modernization Commission. 
Dean Steven Steinglass, senior policy director for the Commission, provides a 
unique perspective on this process.18 Dean Steinglass is the leading scholar of 
the Ohio state constitution.19 His article in this symposium provides invaluable 
information both to Ohioans and to those in other states considering 
techniques of amendment and revision to their own state constitutions.20 Other 
states have utilized the Commission method, whereby a small group of experts 
studies the constitution and makes recommendations to the legislature for 
needed change.21 The only exception to this approach is in Florida, where two 
                                                                                                                     
 13 Robert F. Williams, Response, Why State Constitutions Matter, 45 NEW ENG. L. 
REV. 901, 905 (2011). 
 14 G. Alan Tarr & Robert F. Williams, Foreword, Getting from Here to There: 
Twenty-First Century Mechanisms and Opportunities in State Constitutional Reform, 36 
RUTGERS L.J. 1075, 1076–77 (2005). 
 15 G. Alan Tarr, Popular Constitutionalism in State and Nation, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. 237 
(2016). 
 16 See, e.g., Sanford Levinson, Foreword, State Constitutions as Artifacts of 
Experimentations, 44 RUTGERS L.J. 579, 579 (2014).  
 17 Sanford Levinson & William Blake, When Americans Think About Constitutional 
Reform: Some Data and Reflections, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. 211 (2016). See also generally 
SANFORD LEVINSON, FRAMED: AMERICA’S 51 CONSTITUTIONS AND THE CRISIS OF 
GOVERNANCE (2012); SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION: WHERE 
THE CONSTITUTION GOES WRONG (AND HOW WE THE PEOPLE CAN CORRECT IT) (2006). In 
reviewing Professor Levinson’s book Framed, I suggested reference to a number of state 
constitutional methods of revision and amendment as having possible applicability to 
Professor Levinson’s call for changes to the Federal Constitution. See Robert F. Williams, 
Unsettling the Settled: Challenging the Great and Not-So-Great Compromises in the 
Constitution, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1149, 1159–62 (2013) (book review). 
 18 Steven H. Steinglass, Constitutional Revision: Ohio Style, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. 281 
(2016). 
 19 See, e.g., STEVEN H. STEINGLASS & GINO J. SCARSELLI, THE OHIO STATE 
CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE (2004).  
 20 See generally Steinglass, supra note 18. 
 21 WILLIAMS, supra note 12, at 381–87. 
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automatic, periodic commissions are authorized in the state constitution itself 
to present their proposed changes directly to the electorate.22 
III. INTERPRETING STATE CONSTITUTIONS: 
THE PROBLEM OF LOCKSTEPPING 
Early in the evolution of the New Judicial Federalism then-Justice Shirley 
Abrahamson noted the phenomenon of “lockstepping” in state constitutional 
rights litigation. In 1985, she noted that state constitutional law rights cases 
could be “classified into . . . two distinguishable groups”: 
On one side stand the cases intentionally adopting federal decisional law as 
interpretive of their own constitutions. Some state courts merely say that the 
texts of the two constitutions are substantially similar and should be similarly 
construed. Other state courts analyze the state constitution, or the federal 
doctrine, or both, and explain the reasons for adopting federal decisional 
law.23 
She concluded that: 
[S]tate cases adopting federal law as state constitutional law will have to be 
studied carefully to analyze the reasons for and manner of adopting federal 
law, and to determine whether state courts change their interpretations of the 
state constitutions as United States Supreme Court and sister state court 
decisions take new paths.24 
Being a little slow on the uptake, and preoccupied with Justice 
Abrahamson’s second category of those cases (departing from federal 
constitutional law), it was twenty years until I realized the importance of the 
first category. Borrowing from Dr. Barry Latzer’s formulation,25 I identified 
three categories of lockstepping: (1) unreflective adoptionism, (2) reflective 
adoptionism, and (3) prospective lockstepping.26 The first possibility, 
                                                                                                                     
 22 Robert F. Williams, Foreword, Is Constitutional Revision Success Worth Its 
Popular Sovereignty Price?, 52 FLA. L. REV. 249, 252 (2000); Robert F. Williams, The 
Florida Constitution Revision Commission in Historic and National Context, 50 FLA. L. 
REV. 215, 220 (1998). 
 23 Shirley S. Abrahamson, Criminal Law and State Constitutions: The Emergence of 
State Constitutional Law, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1141, 1181–82. Justice Abrahamson continued: 
“The second group of cases . . . do depart from federal precedent. These cases will also 
have to be studied to analyze the reasons for and manner of the departure.” Id. at 1182. 
 24 Id. at 1182. 
 25 Barry Latzer, The New Judicial Federalism and Criminal Justice: Two Problems 
and a Response, 22 RUTGERS L.J. 863, 864 (1991); see also Ronald K.L. Collins & Peter J. 
Galie, Models of Post-Incorporation Judicial Review: 1985 Survey of State Constitutional 
Individual Rights Decisions, 55 U. CIN. L. REV. 317, 323–24 (1986) (discussing the 
“equivalence model”). 
 26 Robert F. Williams, State Courts Adopting Federal Constitutional Doctrine: Case-
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unreflective adoptionism, is unjustified because it reflects a knee-jerk, 
“pavlovian”27 response to a state constitutional claim that is similar to federal 
constitutional doctrine by simply adopting federal doctrine without discussion. 
This is, of course, less common after a number of decades of the New Judicial 
Federalism. Coincidentally, I utilized two Ohio cases to illustrate the next two 
categories. First, I cited Simmons-Harris v. Goff as an example of reflective 
adoptionism.28 The Ohio Supreme Court, in the context of a challenge to 
school vouchers, examined the state constitutional religion clauses as well as 
the First Amendment. It concluded that the state and federal provisions, 
although differently worded, could both be enforced using the federal Lemon 
test.29 Notably, however, the court concluded by stating: “We reserve the right 
to adopt a different constitutional standard pursuant to the Ohio Constitution, 
whether because the federal constitutional standard changes or for any other 
relevant reason.”30 Thus, the court did adopt federal constitutional doctrine for 
the interpretation of its state constitutional provision, but only for that case. 
There is relatively uniform agreement that reflective adoptionism is clearly 
legitimate because, as Professor Gardner has stated: “[T]here is nothing at all 
wrong with state judges adopting U.S. Supreme Court terminology and 
analyses merely because they think the Court’s approach does an effective job 
of protecting the relevant liberties.”31  
The real problem with lockstepping, however, comes when state courts 
decide to incorporate federal constitutional doctrine and results into their state 
constitutional interpretation for specific cases and in the future.32 Again, I 
pointed to an Ohio decision, Eastwood Mall, Inc. v. Slanco, where the Ohio 
Supreme Court decided that free speech and expression in private shopping 
malls would not be protected under the Ohio Constitution.33 The court added 
to its holding the following statement: “When the First Amendment does not 
protect speech that infringes on private property rights, Section 11 does not 
protect that speech either.”34 I have criticized this form of “prospective 
                                                                                                                     
by-Case Adoptionism or Prospective Lockstepping? 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1499, 1505–
1513 (2005). 
 27 State v. Havlat, 385 N.W.2d 436, 447 (Neb. 1986) (Shanahan, J., dissenting).  
 28 Simmons-Harris v. Goff, 711 N.E.2d 203, 207–16 (Ohio 1999). 
 29 Id. at 211. 
 30 Id. at 212 (emphasis added). 
 31 James A. Gardner, State Constitutional Rights as Resistance to National Power: 
Toward a Functional Theory of State Constitutions, 91 GEO. L.J. 1003, 1059 (2003); see 
also Williams, supra note 26, at 1506–09. 
 32 Williams, supra note 26, at 1509; see also James K. Leven, A Roadmap to State 
Judicial Independence Under the Illinois Limited Lockstep Doctrine Predicated on the 
Intent of the Framers of the 1970 Illinois Constitution and Illinois Tradition, 62 DEPAUL L. 
REV. 63, 64–65 (2012). 
 33 Eastwood Mall, Inc. v. Slanco, 626 N.E.2d 59, 60 (Ohio 1994). I had earlier 
analyzed these Ohio decisions in Robert F. Williams, The New Judicial Federalism in 
Ohio: The First Decade, 51 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 415, 434–35 (2004).  
 34 Eastwood Mall, 626 N.E.2d at 61. 
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lockstepping” as beyond an actual holding that a state court may reach, that 
has the effect of chilling state constitutional research and argument, and in 
effect inappropriately amending the state constitution without any amendment 
procedure.35 
Notably, these issues of lockstepping in state constitutional law remain a 
current issue in the Ohio courts. In the recent case, State v. Brown, the Ohio 
Supreme Court, in a 5–2 decision, has continued to debate whether, and the 
extent to which, the Court should interpret Ohio’s state constitutional search 
and seizure provision as “coextensive” with the United States Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment.36 The members of the Court also 
disagreed over whether there were “compelling reasons” to interpret the state 
constitution to be more protective than its federal counterpart.37 
IV. STATE CONSTITUTIONS AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
Just as at the federal level, state governments have evolved to include an 
important element of the “Administrative State.” Therefore, again just as at the 
federal level, state administrative agencies and processes must comport with 
the governing constitutional standards.38 Very important structure-of-
government issues such as the nondelegation doctrine, and separation-of-
powers limitations on legislative appointments to administrative boards in the 
executive branch also occur at the state level just as often as under federal 
constitutional law. Just as in the area of rights protections, and even slightly 
more so in the ways states decide to structure their governments, federal 
constitutional decisions and doctrines do not need to be followed by the states. 
As Dean Robert A. Schapiro has pointed out, by contrast to federal 
constitutional rights protections, most of which have been incorporated to 
apply to the states, “federal separation of powers doctrine does not apply 
directly to the states. This factor, in particular, means that the pragmatic and 
institutional benefits of following federal individual rights case law do not 
apply in the separation of powers area.”39 
He continued: 
For similar reasons, interpreting state constitutions in lockstep with 
federal separation of powers law would not further the cause of uniformity. 
Because federal doctrine in this realm does not apply to the states, only one 
body of separation of powers law will exist. . . . 
                                                                                                                     
 35 Williams, supra note 26, at 1520–29. 
 36 See generally State v. Brown, 39 N.E.3d 496 (Ohio 2015). I am indebted to Steve 
Steinglass for pointing out this case to me. 
 37 Id. at 503–07 (French, J., dissenting). I have referred to this as the “criteria 
approach.” WILLIAMS, supra note 12, at 146. 
 38 See generally Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 
HARV. L. REV. 1231 (1994). 
 39 Robert A. Schapiro, Contingency and Universalism in State Separation of Powers 
Discourse, 4 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 79, 92–93 (1998). 
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The unincorporated status of federal separation of powers law also means 
that judicial restraint does not counsel lockstep interpretation. . . . To put it 
slightly differently, in the separation of powers area state courts have 
nowhere to hide. Federal law provides no constitutional floor. . . . Deviating 
from federal doctrine and adopting a more flexible approach might better 
advance the goal of judicial restraint.40 
Dean Schapiro’s perspective is extremely important when analyzing state 
separation of power questions in the administrative law context, and simply 
reflects the well established view of Justice Holmes: “We shall assume that 
when, as here, a state constitution sees fit to unite legislative and judicial 
powers in a single hand, there is nothing to hinder so far as the Constitution of 
the United States is concerned.”41 
Professor Jim Rossi is probably the leading expert in the country on the 
interaction of state and federal administrative law.42 His article in this 
Symposium continues his careful coverage of this complex and increasingly 
important field of law, by analyzing the delegation of legislative authority, 
already different under state constitutions,43 not to state agencies but to federal 
law and regulations.44 He makes strong legal and practical arguments for why 
this incorporation of future federal law into state statutes should be permitted 
even though it seems at first blush to abdicate state lawmaking power to a 
different sovereign. 
Professor Aaron Saiger breaks new ground in his important and 
provocative article drawing similarities between state administrative law and 
local government law.45 He shows that much would be added to our 
understanding of these two seemingly disparate areas if we took more 
seriously their interconnection. 
V. CONCLUSION 
This symposium successfully links Justice Brennan’s stimulus of the New 
Judicial Federalism, and its resulting new interest in state constitutions to the 
current, continuing issues in state constitutional law. These issues are not 
going away and these contributions will add greatly to further analysis and 
understanding of this important component of constitutional law. 
                                                                                                                     
 40 Id. at 93–94. 
 41 Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210, 225 (1908). 
 42 See, e.g., Jim Rossi, Dual Constitutions and Constitutional Duels: Separation of 
Powers and State Implementation of Federally Inspired Regulatory Programs and 
Standards, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1343 (2005). 
 43 WILLIAMS, supra note 12, at 255–57. 
 44 Jim Rossi, The Dynamic Incorporation of Federal Law, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. 457 
(2016). 
 45 Aaron Saiger, Local Government as a Choice of Agency Form, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. 
423 (2016). 
